Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy

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So, that whole chapter is devoted to semi-dismissing some of the weaker arguments FOR the existence of God. Some people will be delighted and encouraged by the conclusions that the author shepherds us towards, but religious people, agnostics, free-thinking philosophers and even open-minded atheists (I know there are some) will be disappointed. Whoever you are, whatever you believe, you have to admit that there are zero bomb-proof arguments for or against the existence of God. From a religious point of view, that can only be a good thing. Evidence of God's existence would remove the need for faith, and with it all those meritorious benefits of faith-based belief. If there were any bomb-proof arguments against God, then we wouldn't keep getting fed with all the weaker arguments. My favorite part of this book has to be the chapter on God. I found it brilliant and rewarding. It has none of the faults that plague the other chapters. The flow of information seems perfect with one argument leading seamlessly into another with just the right amount of commentary in between. It also has some real gems from Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion that are sure to delight the skeptics and non-believers amongst you. This brilliant observation by Wittgenstein takes the cake, however: "A nothing works just as well as a something about which nothing could be said." Although SB tries to be objective, he is quite clearly not sold on theology and its claims, so you religious folks have been warned. proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my The reason why I would now recommend it so much is, ironically, because it is an introduction to some of the most interesting areas of philosophy. Some areas in the book I had studied previously, and enjoyed hearing about again, and some of them I hadn’t even considered. interpret its experience and make sense of its environment. (See pp.138-140.) If these non-dualistic ways of thinking can be

Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy : Blackburn

tradition (and in some other religious traditions as well). On the other side we have a view rooted in a Dreier's chapter ("Another World: The Metaethics and Metametaethics of Reasons Fundamentalism") provides a fruitful starting point. Dreier asks how we should we explain the connection between normative thought and action and considers, in the light of this issue, the relationship between Scanlon's view, according to which "there are irreducible, non-natural normative facts . . . about normative properties" (p. 155), and quasi-realism. Let's assume that someone who thinks that she ought to perform an action, φ, will, if she is rational, also intend to φ. Call this thesis practicality. This thesis may seem obviously true. But Dreier rightly insists that even obvious truths may be in need of explanation, and that practicality is a case in point. One might suggest that practicality simply follows from the essence of rationality, but Dreier proposes -- plausibly, to my mind -- that we should find a deeper explanation for how the different requirements of rationality hang together. He writes:

text, but we might call it ‘naturalism’ or ‘materialism’ or ‘physicalism’. In Chapter Two it appears in two forms -- as would solve the problem of personal identity. We can say that what makes me the same person through all the changes I This is one of the many books about philosophy as a whole without a clear point to it. Besides illustrating how philosophy is hypothetically useful to create a better society overall. Which is an unproven claim he is making. So it does start on a false premise unfortunately. But following that premise he does go into some interesting quotes from old philosophers that make you think. But...

Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy eBook Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy eBook

Letters: Harsh judgments on the pope and religion". The Guardian. London. 15 September 2010 . Retrieved 16 September 2010. Well, in the course of my career I have found them successively the most interesting, I suppose. As you say, I started in philosophy of science and epistemology, and moved onto philosophy of language and then ethics. At those different times I have been obsessed by the particular things I had been doing. Just at the present time I have been fascinated by the philosophy of truth and that is what I am trying to work on just now. In your writings you often deal (as you mentioned yourself earlier) with an important philosophical concept, namely ‘truth’. What is your definition of ‘truth’? Many of our readers would be interested in hearing your opinion on whether there is such a thing as ‘absolute truth’? In the Oxford Companion to Philosophy Ted Honderich says that you defend ‘quasi-realism’. Do you agree with this comment? If so, what exactly is ‘quasi-realism’?

Concrete Examples – You’ll get practical advice illustrated with examples of real-world applications or anecdotes. Well structured – You’ll find this to be particularly well organized to support its reception or application. I think David Hume stands head and shoulders above anyone else. I still think he’s the greatest philosopher Britain has produced and one of the great world philosophers. After that I would say Wittgenstein. the size increases; it becomes liquid and hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you strike it, it no like a round square or a number that is both odd and even. We can say the words, but we don’t really

Think - Simon Blackburn - Oxford University Press

Superb. A helpful and/or enlightening book that is extremely well rounded, has many strengths and no shortcomings worth mentioning. Well, gosh, that’s a big one! On the definition of truth I suppose I am trying at present to decide between two positions: one is called minimalism which says that there is no such thing as a definition of truth. The only thing you can say about truth that if you give me a sentence like ‘there is a seagull there’ then I’ll tell you what makes it true, namely there being a seagull there. That is an absolutely trivial thing to say but it is the only thing to say according to the minimalist about truth, or nearly the only thing to say— there are bells and whistles but that is the core of the position. The other position I’m attracted to is I think more like that of Donald Davidson, which says that there are things to be said about truth but they have to be said alongside things you say about belief, about the mind, about nature, about virtually every other aspect of philosophy. So, truth can’t form a separate or distinctive topic on its own. So I’m undecided between those two positions; they are quite close but they are interestingly different. As for absolute truth, I’m not sure that the word ‘absolute’ adds much. I don’t believe there is a coherent concept of ‘relative truth’ although there are, of course, judgements some people make and other people don’t make. But whenever you make a judgement you are aspiring to say something that is true. True fullstop, I think, not true absolutely or true relatively. I am not sure that those qualifications help very much. But if I’m forced to choose I prefer to say true absolutely. Your book, Being Good , has recently been published. I think it is a clearly written introduction to some fundamental ethical issues. What in particular motivated you to write about ‘Being Good’? SB, to his credit, has managed to keep the reader sufficiently engaged by keeping the difficulty of the content just out of reach. This can be frustrating for casual readers but if you're interested in the subject, it pushes you to actively think about what you are reading even though you don't quite get it eight times out of ten.Written with exemplary concision and with conviction that philosophy needn't be an ethereal subject, alienated from practical concerns."-- Booklist they determined (even pre-determined)? How then can my choices be free? (This sort of reasoning has led some thinkers to conclude that free will Are you pessimistic about that as well? No, I’m not pessimistic about philosophy in general. I think I am just pessimistic about metaphysics and in particular about some bits of metaphysics. Other parts I think may have gone along much better; philosophy of modality, for example. I think interesting work has been done on time by people like Hugh Price and Hugh Mellor. So, I think there are places where metaphysics can progress. I suspect that what people are going to want from philosophy over the next certainly 30 years is much more in the social, political and moral sphere than in metaphysics. I think the events of September 11th will just accelerate that process.